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Abstract 
Research investigating the determinants of banking performance has been at the centre of policy and academic 
debate following the global financial crisis (2007-2009). Thus, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the 
assessment of the factors impacting banking efficiency. Whilst there are many studies investigating this prob-
lem in developed and emerging countries, there is little research addressing this question in the countries of 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN as a region is among one of the fastest 
growing in the world. Using system GMM this paper examines the effects of ownership and risk on efficiency 
for 71 banks of the ASEAN countries, considering the period 2011-2016. All financial and economic data are 
deflated by their corresponding Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) to the 2011 price level to control for inflation 
effects and are converted to constant US dollars by using the 2005 PPP conversion rates. We use stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate a measure of bank efficiency. This allows the measurement of inefficiency 
for each bank from the best-practice frontier incorporating bank, industry- and country-specific variables. 
Moreover, this study explores the efficiency effects of six categories of bank ownership such as widely-held, 
bank, institutional, industry, family and state. The findings indicate that different categories of ownership have 
different effects on bank efficiency. Particularly, they show that the widely-held banks and the banks with the 
bank controlling ownership experience lower efficiency. The results additionally indicate that overall risk-
taking improves efficiency; however, higher levels of risk-taking lower efficiency. The paper also provides 
some relevant policy-implications.  
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Introduction 
Assessing the factors impacting banking efficiency is an important question for both policymakers and re-
searchers. Currently there are only a limited number of  studies that are exploring the determinants of banking 
efficiency (Delis et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2017; Fiordelisi et al., 2011), also, the studies focusing on the 
banking efficiency in South East Asia are limited. Thus, the aim of this study is to investigate the effects of 
ownership and risk on the banking efficiency in the ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) 
countries for the period 2011-2016. 
Banks play a leading role in the financial systems of emerging countries.  They do this by (1) providing 
monetary payments at lower costs, (2) mobilising and allocating funds in the most efficient way, and (3) 
improving the saving and investment that are important for sustainable economic growth. Following the Asian 
financial crisis (1997), and the recent global financial crisis (2007-2009), the banking sectors of the ASEAN 
countries have undergone significant reforms and deregulation. Moreover, the ASEAN Central Bank Gover-
nors endorsed the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF) in 2014. The aim of this framework is to 
improve the quality of financial services, promote competition, increase the access to other ASEAN markets, 
and strengthen the financial stability, as well as to facilitate the regulatory and supervisory cooperation among 
the ASEAN countries. Therefore, it is interesting to explore the determinants of the banking efficiency in 
these countries.   
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This study contributes to the existing research in several aspects. Firstly, this study focuses on the ASEAN 
countries while considering the post crisis (2011-2016) period. Secondly, this paper uses more extended own-
ership categories, such as widely-held, banks, institutional, industrial, family as well as state/public. Finally, 
this research investigates the effects of low-risk, medium-risk and high-risk levels on banking efficiency.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the economic and the institutional conditions of 
the ASEAN countries. Section 3 develops the hypotheses, and section 4 discusses the data and its sources. 
Section 5 analyses the results and the final section concludes them.     
1. Economic and Institutional environment in ASEAN  
The ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 by the five original member countries (ASEAN-5), namely, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Then, Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 
1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. 
The aim of the association is to accelerate and sustain the region’s economic growth, social progress, and 
cultural development, as well as to promote regional peace and stability through justice.    
The ASEAN as a region is among one of the fastest growing in the world. Particularly, the region’s GDP has 
more than quadrupled, increasing from USD 577 billion in 1999 to USD 2,500 billion in 2016 making it the 
world’s sixth-largest economy (The Future of ASEAN Time to Act, 2018). Moreover, the ASEAN has managed 
to sustain the average growth rate of 5% over the past 10 years, while the world’s average growth for the same 
period has remained at 3%. 
In addition, the ASEAN as a region is among one of the most successful that is controlling price volatility. 
During the post-global crisis, the region initially experienced high inflation rates (Figure 1). However, the 
monetary authorities of the member countries have managed to control the inflation rates below 3% (since 
2013) successfully implementing an inflation-targeting monetary policy. 
 
Figure 1. Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2018. 
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries are slow institutional reformers. The statistics in Table 1 below show 
the dynamics of six governance indicators from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank, where 
each indicator ranges from -2.5 (lowest) to 2.5 (highest). 
The first indicator, Voice and Accountability, shows whether citizens have a right to select their government. 
This indicator additionally comprises freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. In 
addition, the second indicator Political Stability captures the possibility of the political destabilisation of a 
government caused by unconstitutional or violent events. The statistics for both indicators remain negative 
implying that the region remains under-developed in terms of its institutional development. However, the 
scores for both Government Effectiveness and Regulatory quality are relatively higher. This implies that the 
quality of policy formulation and its implementation are of good standards. They also show that the govern-
ments have been advocating the development of private sectors.  
The following indicator Rule of Law indicates the quality of the law (i.e. contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts). Although the ASEAN countries have made significant improvements, the scores 
still remain very low showing the presence of a lower quality of law. Finally, Control of Corruption refers to 
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the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Similar to the previous indicators, the scores 
for Control of Corruption remain very low.   
Table 1. Dynamics of Governance Indicators 
Years Voice and Account-
ability 
Political Stabil-
ity 
Government Ef-
fectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of Law Control of Cor-
ruption 
2011 -0.412 -0.306 0.497 0.233 0.049 -0.027 
2012 -0.333 -0.228 0.479 0.295 0.066 0.044 
2013 -0.343 -0.206 0.499 0.321 0.095 0.102 
2014 -0.399 -0.101 0.620 0.435 0.200 0.100 
2015 -0.425 -0.137 0.579 0.427 0.177 0.083 
2016 -0.496 -0.135 0.573 0.413 0.279 0.078 
Source: World Governance Indicators of World Bank. 
The ASEAN countries have been making significant progress in their financial system development, particu-
larly in banking sector development. Figure 2 below presents Domestic credit to the private sector by banks. 
In advanced economies, the share of domestic credit given to the private sector relative to GDP reaches 100% 
or even higher. Figure 2 shows the comparison of domestic credit given to the private sector by the banks (as 
a percentage of GDP) in 6 ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam) implying that the countries have been steadily increasing it over the period 2011-2016. 
 
Figure 2. Domestic credit to the private sector by banks (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2018. 
Thus, the discussions show that the ASEAN countries have specific features not observable in other countries. 
Particularly, they are fast-growing economies and they have financial sectors with underdeveloped institu-
tions. Therefore, the research focusing on this area is interesting and delivers new evidence.  
2. Hypotheses development 
The bank’s corporate governance, regulation and performance have received significant research interest par-
ticularly following the Asian (1997) as well as the recent global financial crisis (2007-2009). However, the 
majority of the relevant studies focus on the US, European and Chinese banking sectors. To fill in this gap 
this paper explores the effects of (1) the various categories of bank ownership, and (2) their risk-taking be-
haviour on bank efficiency.  
Many studies focusing on the impact of ownership on bank efficiency consider three mutually exclusive cat-
egories of ownership, such as foreign, private and state (Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Karas 
et al., 2010). Those investigating transition countries and emerging markets find foreign banks to be the most 
efficient relative to domestic privately-owned and state-owned banks (Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan and Mar-
ton, 2003). In this study, however, we extend the relevant research by introducing two groups of bank owner-
ship, such as banks with no controlling shareholder (dispersed ownership), as well as the banks with control-
ling shareholders (concentrated ownership), as described by Saghi-Zedek (2016). 
The agency theory is the dominant theoretical reference analysing the relationship between owners and man-
agers. According to the theory, small shareholders have relatively weak motivation to monitor the managers 
of banks with dispersed ownership (widely-held banks). This provides an opportunity for the managers to 
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prioritise their private interests (employment risk aversion and empire building), which may ultimately lead 
to lower bank performances (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). For example, the managers are more likely to 
maintain value-reducing diversification (activities) in the firms with dispersed ownership.  
However, empirical studies provide contradicting results on the ownership-performance link. Particularly, 
Haw et al. (2010) find that dispersed banks show better performance, higher cost efficiency, greater return 
volatility, and lower insolvency risk relative to the banks with higher control concentration.The reason might 
be that concentrated banks tend to become an easy tool for tunnelling, since controlling shareholders could 
lend credits with more favourable terms to connected partners. Similarly, family-controlled and corporate-
controlled banks in five East Asian countries experienced high loan growth over the pre-Asian financial crisis 
period (Laeven, 1999). Thus, as the theory and empirical studies deliver contradicting predictions on the own-
ership-performance link, our first hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1. Widely-held banks exhibit lower efficiency.  
On the other hand, larger owners have stronger incentives to monitor the bank managers and are more pow-
erful to increase their inclination to maximise the shareholder value. However, not all larger owners contribute 
to higher performance. Empirical studies state that larger bank, institutional and industrial owners are able to 
transfer their experience to improve bank performance (Saghi-Zedek, 2016). Particularly, institutional inves-
tors (financial companies) tend to have experience of managing riskier activities, while banks hold valuable 
information about their clients and customers. Moreover, industrial companies tend to manage sophisticated 
and diversified assets portfolios. Thus, institutional investors, banks and industrial companies can transfer 
their unique knowledge and expertise to their owned banks where the latter lack experience. This may ulti-
mately lead banks to improve their performance.  
Hypothesis 2. Larger owners such as banks, institutional investors and industrial companies improve bank 
performance.   
However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find an insignificant link between concentrated ownership and profita-
bility when they control for the effects of other variables. Similarly, Iannotta et al. (2007) find no relationship 
between ownership concentration and banks profitability.  
Family owners are reluctant to give up control, and, thus, are risk-averse. In addition, they do not want to 
attract equity from the stock markets. Moreover, the expropriation hypothesis states that families derive pri-
vate benefits from running the company at the expense of minority shareholders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). Moreover, government ownership internalises the link between the company and the government. As 
governments pay special attention to political goals, their non-profit maximisation behaviour leads to lower 
performance in state-owned companies (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Thus, our third hypothesis is as fol-
lows: 
Hypothesis 3. Banks with family and state ownership exhibit lower efficiency.  
Early studies put forward several hypotheses to explain the link between risk and efficiency. In particular, 
Berger and De Young (1997) introduce the “cost skimping” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, banks 
appear to be more cost efficient when they use fewer resources for screening and monitoring loans. In the 
short-run, therefore, the amount of non-performing loans remains unchanged. However, in the medium- and 
long-run banks need to obtain more resources to administer future higher risk (due to higher levels of non-
performing loans). Therefore, banks obtain higher levels of profits in the short-run due to the cost of laxer 
loan screening and monitoring. Moreover, the impact of risk on efficiency might be non-linear implying that 
the effect becomes negative beyond a certain level of risk-taking. Thus, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4. Risk improves banking efficiency 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Sample. The sample consists of 71 banks from six countries of the ASEAN, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The data are an unbalanced panel, sourced from Orbis. All 
commercial banks, whose financial statements are available for at least three years during the period 2011-
2016, are included. Data for GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, real interest rate and interest rate spread 
are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The control of corruption data are fromthe World 
Bank Governance Indicatorsand the legal origin data are from La Porta (1999). All financial and economic 
data are deflated by their corresponding CPIs to the 2011 price level to control for inflation effects and are 
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converted to constant US dollars by using the 2005 PPP conversion rates following the relevant studies (Fu et 
al., 2014). 
3.2. Measuring efficiency (dependent variable). To estimate a measure of efficiency we use stochastic fron-
tier analysis (SFA), as proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995).  This allows the measurement of inefficiency 
for each bank from the best-practice frontier in a single step estimation incorporating bank-, industry- and 
country-specific variables. We follow Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) and Luo et al. (2016) in selecting input 
and output variables for the profit frontier and take an intermediation approach. That is, we treat banks as 
financial intermediaries collecting funds (deposits) as inputs, and transforming them into loans or other assets. 
Thus, we choose two output prices:  (1) the ratio of interest income to loans (p1), and (2) the ratio of non-
interest income to other earning assets (p2). There are three input prices: (1) the cost of loanable funds esti-
mated by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits (w1); (2) the cost of physical capital measured by the 
ratio of overhead expenses to fixed assets (w2); and (3) the cost of labour calculated by the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets (w3). To control for different bank risk profiles, we include Equity as a quasi-fixed 
input following Berger and Mester (1997). We also use w3 to normalise prices and include a time trend to 
account for the changes in technology over time (T=0 for 2010, T=1 for 2011, to T=6 for 2016).  
The profit function also includes GDP per capita growth and interest rate spread to account for cross-country 
heterogeneity. We consider a multi-product transcendental logarithmic (translog) function to estimate the 
profit efficiency of banks. This functional form is widely used in previous studies and provides more flexibility 
when modelling the efficiency frontier (Luo et al., 2016; Tabak et al., 2012). The model specification for the 
frontier is as follows: 
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where νi, t is the random error assumed to be independent and identically distributed N (0, ߪ௩ଶ); ui,tis a non-
negative random inefficiency term assumed to be independent but not identically distributed. The term ui, t 
follows a truncated-normal distribution with truncation (at zero) of the N (mi, t, ߪ௨ଶ). The mean is defined as 
mi, t= zi, tδ, where zi, t is a (1 x M) vector of explanatory variables associated with the technical inefficiency 
effectsin (1), while δ is a (M x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated in (1). Profit is the pre-tax 
profits of bank i at time t. The coefficients of (1) are estimated in a single-step by using the maximum likeli-
hood approach.1 
Following Bos and Koetter (2011), we incorporate an additional independent variable, the negative profit 
indicator (NPI), to account for those banks that report negative profits, as the dependent variable requires the 
natural logarithmic transformation, and this is undefined for negative values. In particular, profit is assigned 
a value of 1when profit≤0; then, NPI equals 1 when profit≥0 and equals the absolute value of profit when the 
latter is negative. Tabak et al. (2011), Gananis and Pasiouras (2013) and Luo et al. (2016) use this approach 
when modeling banks with negative profit. 
3.3. Ownership and risk variables. We follow Saghi-Zedek (2016) to form ownership variables. Particularly, 
we fix a minimum percentage of shares above which the owners exert effective controls over banks. This 
paper uses a control threshold of 10% following Saghi-Zedek (2016). The ownership relevant data are from 
Orbis and the banks’ annual reports disclosed in their websites. We consider banks as widely-held (Widely-
                                                     
1Once the point estimates of ui,t (inefficiency) are obtained, estimates of technical efficiency are defined as Efficiency=exp(-u). 
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held ownership) when those banks have no controlling shareholder. As controlling shareholders we classify 
five categories, such as banks (Bank ownership), institutions including insurance companies, mutual and pen-
sion funds (Institutional ownership), industrial companies (Industry ownership), managers, individuals and 
family investors (Family ownership) as well as state/public authorities (State ownership) following Saghi-
Zedek (2016). We do not look at the effects of the largest shareholder, but rather assess the controlling effects 
of all shareholders holding at least 10% of bank shares. Therefore the dummy variables with controlling share-
holders are not mutually exclusive implying that one bank may have all five controlling shareholders in this 
study, which is consistent with Saghi-Zedek (2016).  
We use the Z score as a risk variable, which has long been established in the literature (Agoraki et al., 2011).  
It is monotonically associated with the probability of bank failure and is expressed as follows: 
ܼ݅ ,ݐ =
ROAi,t + (E
A
)݅,ݐ
SD(ROA)i,t
 
(2) 
where ROA is return on assets, E/A is the equity to asset ratio (or Capital ratio) and SD(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA. Since the Z score indicates the distance to insolvency, a higher Z score implies a bank is 
less risky. As the Z score is highly skewed we use the natural logarithm, following Beck et al. (2013). 
3.4. Other control variables. To account for bank and cross-country heterogeneity, we use a number of 
variables common in the literature (Agoraki et al., 2011; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Tabak et al., 2012). Par-
ticularly, we use size, capital ratio, liquidity, traditional banking and diversification as bank-specific variables. 
Since economic conditions impact on bank behaviour, we use GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and real 
interest rate to account for the economic environment. As institutional variables we utilise the data on the 
control of corruption and the legal origin. The control of corruption shows the perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain and is from the World Bank Governance Indicators of the 
World Bank. The data for Legal origin indicate the commercial code of each country and are taken from La 
Porta et al. (1999). The legal origins of the countries in this sample reflect the UK legal origin (Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand) and French legal origin (Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam). 
Table 2. Description and Source of Data 
Variables Description Sources 
1.Main variables 
ln ZROA score Natural logarithm of Z score Orbis 
Widely-held ownership Dummy equal to one when there is no controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Orbis and annual re-
ports via banks’ web-
sites 
Bank ownership Dummy equal to one if the bank has at least another banking institution as a control-ling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Institutional ownership Dummy equal to one if the bank has at least an institutional investor as a controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Industry ownership Dummy equal to one if the bank has at least an industrial investor as a controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
State ownership Dummy equal to one if the bank has at least a state as a controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Family ownership Dummy equal to one if the bank has at least a family investor as a controlling share-holder, and zero otherwise. 
2. Control variables 
2A. Bank-specific control variables 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Orbis 
Capital Ratio Equity/Total Assets 
Diversification Non-interest income /Pre-tax profit 
Liquidity (1) Gross loans / Total deposit 
Liquidity (2) Liquid assets / Total deposit 
Traditional banking Gross loans / total assets 
2B. Macroeconomic control variables 
GDP growth Annual percentage changes in GDP 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indica-
tors 
GDP per capita growth Annual percentage changes in GDP per capita 
Real interest rate It is approximately the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate. 
Interest rate spread It is the difference between borrowing and lending rates. 
2C. Institutional control variables 
Control of corruption It shows the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. 
World Bank Govern-
ance Indicators. 
Legal origin (UK) 
Legal origin (French) This indicates the commercial code of each country (UK or French). La Porta et al. (1999). 
3.5. Summary statistics. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the banks-specific variables are in Table 
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2. The standard deviation of Size, Diversification and ZROA score indicates that these variables significantly 
vary across the countries. Also, Table 3 (see in Appendix) shows that the efficiency is negatively correlated 
with Bank ownership, Industry ownership and Family ownership. However, this association is positive with 
Institutional ownership and State ownership. This implies that the banks with Bank, Industry and Family 
ownership are possibly less efficient, but the opposite might be true for the banks with Institutional and State 
ownership. All correlations are less than 45% excluding the correlation between Liquidity (1) and Traditional 
banking; however, the latter was removed from the regressions as it was statistically not significant.  
Finally, Table-3 presents the means of the country-environmental variables (for the period 2011-2016) and 
these areused in the specifications. Particularly, the table includes the macroeconomic and the institutional 
variables. The average means of GDP growth and GDP per capita growth are higher in Malaysia and Singa-
pore implying that these countries experienced relatively higher macroeconomic growth. In addition, all coun-
tries have positive real interest rates; however, the rates are again higher in Malaysia and Singapore.    
Table 4. Country-environmental variables 
 GDP growth GDP per capita 
growth 
Real interest 
rate 
Control of cor-
ruption 
Legal origin 
(UK) 
Legal origin 
(French) 
 Indonesia 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.547 0 1 
 Malaysia 2.777 1.802 1.565 0.231 1 0 
 Philippines 0.259 0.186 0.157 -0.505 0 1 
 Singapore 3.205 1.765 4.452 2.088 1 0 
 Thailand 0.180 0.155 0.291 -0.397 1 0 
 Vietnam 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.47 0 1 
Source: GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and Real interest rate are from World Bank Development Indicators, Control of corrup-
tion is from World Bank Governance Indicators and Legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1999). 
World Governance Indicators run from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 and higher values correspond to better gov-
ernance. This implies that Malaysia and Singapore have a relatively better governance of corruption in place.  
4. Estimation and Results 
4.1. Model specification. In this study, we investigate the effects of ownership and risk on the bank efficiency 
in the ASEAN countries by using system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with 
Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The advantage of the system GMM is that the approach successfully 
addresses problems ofendogeneity. Bank strategies are not exogenous and are highly dependent on bank per-
formances. Therefore, we treat bank-specific variables, such as Size, Capital Ratio, Liquidity (1), Liquidity 
(2), Traditional banking and Diversification, as endogenous variables (Saghi-Zedek, 2016). However, bank 
ownership and risk remain stable in the ASEAN countries over the post-crisis period2011-2016, and, there-
fore, we consider these variables as exogenous. In addition, we treat institutional and macro variables as ex-
ogenous. Our specification for the endogenous and exogenous variables is consistent with the literature (Dong 
et al., 2017; Saghi-Zedek, 2016).  
System GMM assumes that the only available instruments are the lags of instrumented variables (Roodman, 
2009). We limit the number of instruments restricting the lag range to three, and test the overall validity of 
the instruments using the Hansen-test. We also perform the Arellano and Bond test for the absence of the 
second order residual autocorrelation (AB test for AR (2)). The estimating equation is specified as follows: 
Efficiency୧,୨,୲ = δEfficiency୧.୨,୲ିଵ +  bଵBank୧,୨,୲ + bଶMacro୨,୲ +  bଷInstitutions୨,୲+ bସOwnership୧୨୲
+  μ୧,୨,୲                                                                                                                                             (3) 
for bank i, in country j at time t. The coefficient δ lies between 0 and 1 and indicates the speed of adjustment. 
Bank includes bank-specific variables such as Size, Capital ratio, Liquidity (1), Liquidity (2), Traditional 
banking, Diversification and the natural logarithm of Z score (ln ZROA score), while Macro comprises GDP 
growth, GDP per capita growth and Real interest rate. In addition, Institutions includes Controlofcorruption 
and Legal origin variables. Finally, ownership represents widely-held banks and five ownership controlling 
dummies. 
We apply the “general-to-specific” method when deciding which control variables should be included in the 
model following Klomp and De Haan (2012). Initially, we estimate model 1 (Table 4) including all control 
variables and year dummies from 2012 to 2016 without our main variables. Then, we delete the least signifi-
cant variable and re-estimate the model. We repeat this procedure until the model (1) includes only significant 
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variables at a 10% level. The main variables of interest, such as the ownership and risk, are then added indi-
vidually in models 2-8, and model 9 includes all variables.  
4.2. Econometric results and discussions. Table 5 shows that the coefficients are quite stable across models, 
and the Hansen test indicates no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Although Table 5 shows the pres-
ence of first-order autocorrelation, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, as this would only 
be the case if second-order autocorrelation was present (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The Arellano-Bond (AB) 
test results in Table 5 indicate the absence of second-order autocorrelation.  
Moreover, the results for the control variables indicate that the capital ratio is negatively associated with profit 
efficiency implying that highly capitalized banks are less profit efficient. More liquid banks, however, appear 
to be more profit efficient. The results for the diversification, however, are not stable across the models.  
Table 5. Results (1) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Capital ratio -5.147*** -6.518*** -5.129*** -
6.117**
* 
-5.158*** -5.040*** -5.106*** -6.141*** -7.348*** 
 (1.759) (1.558) (1.757) (1.516) (1.791) (1.760) (1.734) (1.898) (1.662) 
Liquidity (1) 0.715* 0.528 0.854* 0.598* 0.701* 0.687* 0.706* 0.597 0.514 
 (0.377) (0.352) (0.428) (0.339) (0.364) (0.371) (0.379) (0.387) (0.365) 
Liquidity (2) 1.288*** 1.114*** 1.389*** 1.199**
* 
1.281*** 1.270*** 1.288*** 1.249*** 1.175*** 
 (0.251) (0.231) (0.283) (0.248) (0.246) (0.253) (0.249) (0.247) (0.241) 
Diversification -0.039* -0.046* -0.028 -0.038 -0.039* -0.038* -0.038* -0.024 -0.019 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.025) 
Widely-held ownership  -0.252***       -0.206* 
  (0.083)       (0.118) 
Bank ownership   -0.169**      -0.140* 
   (0.081)      (0.083) 
Institutional ownership    0.105     0.010 
    (0.065)     (0.078) 
Industry ownership     0.006    0.019 
     (0.067)    (0.080) 
State ownership      0.053   0.038 
      (0.067)   (0.068) 
Family ownership       0.001  0.021 
       (0.067)  (0.068) 
ln ZROA score        0.109* 0.103** 
        (0.061) (0.051) 
Number of instruments 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 33 
Hansen t-test 0.417 0.657 0.500 0.484 0.419 0.431 0.412 0.479 0.715 
AB test AR (1) (p-value) 0.030 0.048 0.021 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.024 
AB test AR (2) (p-value) 0.818 0.763 0.962 0.841 0.818 0.813 0.818 0.973 0.949 
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Constant term included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Year dummies 2012-2016 are in-
cluded. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  
The results for the ownership effects (Table 4) indicate that the widely-held banks and the banks with the bank 
controlling ownership display lower efficiency. Moreover, overall risk taking also appears to have positive 
efficiency effects. Particularly, for a bank with the median level of risk, a one standard deviation increases in 
the proportion of risk (57.368 units) leads to an increase in a profit efficiency of 6.25 units.   
To check the robustness of the results, we replace the risk variable with three risk dummy variables, such as 
Low risk banks (≥RiskMean+σRisk), Medium risk banks (<RiskMean+σRisk and >Riskmean-σRisk) and High risk banks 
(≤RiskMean-σRisk) considering the fact that higher Z values (proxy for Risk) imply lower risk. The results for 
the alternative specification are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Results (2) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Capital ratio -7.566*** -7.114*** -6.873*** 
 (1.546) (1.602) (1.413) 
Liquidity (1) 0.508 0.516 0.466 
 (0.399) (0.333) (0.318) 
Liquidity (2) 1.045*** 1.137*** 1.095*** 
 (0.268) (0.249) (0.243) 
Diversification -0.033 -0.031 -0.035 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) 
Widely-held ownership -0.299** -0.261** -0.275** 
 (0.113) (0.128) (0.123) 
Bank ownership -0.119 -0.141* -0.121* 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.072) 
Institutional ownership 0.055 0.096 0.071 
 (0.074) (0.087) (0.069) 
Industry ownership 0.015 0.009 0.028 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.074) 
State ownership 0.036 0.072 0.055 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.062) 
Family ownership 0.031 0.036 0.026 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.056) 
Low risk banks 0.353   
 (0.252)   
Medium risk banks  -0.026  
  (0.088)  
High risk banks   -0.500*** 
   (0.062) 
Number of instruments 33 33 33 
Hansen t-test 0.772 0.728 0.797 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) 0.039 0.034 0.021 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) 0.898 0.966 0.880 
Observations 305 305 305 
Constant term included but not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies 2012-2016 are included. Windmeijer-cor-
rected standard errors are in parentheses. 
The results presented in Table 5 are similar to those presented in Table 4. Particularly, Table 5 indicates that 
the coefficients are again quite stable across models, and the Hansen test indicates no evidence of over-iden-
tifying restrictions. In addition, Table 5 shows the absence of second-order autocorrelation. Moreover, the 
widely-held banks and the banks with bank controlling ownership appear to be less efficient. The banks taking 
high risks appear to be less efficient too. This is consistent with the “cost skimping” hypothesis implying that 
current higher risks may lower efficiency in the medium- and long-run (Berger and DeYoung, 1997).  
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the effects of certain categories of ownership and risk-taking 
activities on efficiency in the banking sector of the ASEAN countries. Therefore, we collected the data for 71 
commercial banks from six countries of the ASEAN members, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, Thailand and Vietnam, for the period 2011-2016.  
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. Firstly, the research focusing on the banking effi-
ciency in the ASEAN countries is limited. Secondly, this paper used more extended ownership categories, 
such as widely-held, banks, institutional, industrial, family, as well as state/public. Thirdly, this study inves-
tigated the effects of low-risk, medium-risk and high risk on banking efficiency.   
Overall, the results show that the widely-held banks and the banks with the bank controlling ownership display 
lower efficiency inconsistent with Haw et al. (2010). Thus, the results imply that the widely-held ownership 
and the bank controlling ownership do not induce the managers to maximise bank efficiency in the ASEAN 
countries. According to the agency theory, managers have more opportunities to prioritise their private inter-
ests in widely-held banks, as small shareholders have relatively lower motivation to monitor managers’ be-
haviour. Surprisingly, the results additionally show that banks (as owners) do not seem to be transferring their 
skills and experience to the banks they own, which would allow the latter to improve efficiency.    
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On the other hand, the results indicate that the risk improves the efficiency in the banking sector of the ASEAN 
countries. However, the effect becomes negative as the level of risk-taking passes beyond a certain level and 
thus high-risk taking lowers efficiency. This is consistent with the “cost skimping” hypothesis (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997).  
From the policy perspectives, the results imply that the policymakers in the ASEAN countries should consider 
the ownership and risk effects while developing strategies to improve banking stability. Particularly, they need 
to discourage banks from taking high risks and limit widely-held and bank ownership in the banking sectors 
of the ASEAN countries.  
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Appendix 
Table 3. Summary statistics and correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1)  Efficiency 0.566 0.243              
(2)  Size 16.780 1.751 0.356             
(3)  Capital ratio 0.110 0.037 -0.164 -0.411            
(4)  Liquidity (1) 0.801 0.178 -0.062 0.136 0.247           
(5)  Liquidity (2) 0.172 0.090 0.092 0.066 -0.002 -0.305          
(6)  Traditional banking 0.627 0.108 -0.115 0.010 0.119 0.826 -0.435         
(7)  Diversification 0.607 2.657 -0.217 0.016 0.045 0.095 -0.108 0.062        
(8)  Widely held ownership 0.046 0.210 -0.088 0.065 -0.216 -0.101 0.044 -0.060 0.066       
(9)  Bank ownership 0.476 0.500 -0.135 0.003 0.037 0.293 0.084 0.261 -0.035 -0.063      
(10  Institutional ownership 0.586 0.493 0.140 0.019 0.075 0.068 -0.113 0.051 0.113 -0.113 -0.051     
(11)  Industry ownership 0.701 0.459 -0.066 -0.208 0.082 -0.013 -0.061 -0.084 0.093 -0.016 0.063 0.357    
(12)  State ownership 0.210 0.408 0.240 0.349 -0.109 0.137 0.111 0.155 -0.038 -0.113 -0.038 -0.230 -0.322   
(13)  Family ownership 0.504 0.501 -0.066 -0.362 0.214 -0.023 0.024 -0.072 0.076 0.072 -0.038 -0.045 0.022 -0.142  
(14)  ZROA score 49.739 57.368 0.076 -0.083 0.319 0.044 0.115 0.074 0.023 -0.128 0.067 0.186 0.093 -0.063 0.194 
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